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1 What do ICDS and PDS attempt to do? 
1.1 Public Distribution System (PDS)
The most visible part of the Public Distribution
System (PDS) in India is the vast network of ‘fair
price shops’ or ‘ration shops’ which periodically
delivers foodgrains and other essential
commodities1 at subsidised prices to the member
households. There were 5.07 lakh fair price shops
as at 31 August 2011 (Department of Food and
Public Distribution 2011). On average there is
one fair price shop for 2,388 people2 ‘officially’
delivering around 86 tons of foodgrains annually.3
Another important component of the PDS is the
equally vast network of procurement centres
managed by the Food Corporation of India (FCI)
and other state corporations. Besides distribution
through the PDS, the procured foodgrains are
also used for maintaining buffer stock,
distribution through other welfare schemes and
release for open market operations/exports. 
The current form of PDS – targeted (TPDS),
with subsidised issue prices for the poor –
emerged from a non-targeted PDS which was in
place till 1991, offering ‘virtually complete
coverage’ (Nair 2000) in certain states like
Kerala. However, PDS was not always a means
for distributing ‘subsidised foodgrain’. Prior to
the mid-1960s, PDS was more a rationing
instrument used in urban areas to control food
prices, manage scarcity and address associated
political problems (Sobhan 1990).
1.2 Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 
The Integrated Child Development Services
(ICDS) is implemented through 12.41 lakh centres
(Ministry of Women and Child Development 2012)
known as Anganwadi Centres (AWCs), each
located in a habitation of 400–800 people.4 The
AWC is the focal point for the delivery of services
and is run by a team of hired women staff – usually
from the local village – known as ‘Anganwadi
workers’ (AWWs) and ‘Anganwadi helpers’
(AWHs). The centres are best known for providing
cooked food and/or foodgrains as supplementary
nutrition to the beneficiaries. However, apart
from preparing and providing supplementary
nutrition, the centres also provide a range of
health, nutrition and preschool education services
in order to achieve comprehensive infant and
child care and development in an integrated
manner.5 As well as children below the age of six,
the programme also aims to address the health
and nutrition needs of pregnant and nursing
mothers, and of adolescent girls. 
Among welfare programmes that address food
insecurity through the provision of subsidised/
free foodgrains, wage employment, and cash
transfers, ICDS is the sole programme that
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specifically aims to focus on undernutrition and
to reach individuals within households. 
2 Who does the programme exclude? 
2.1 Officially excluded people
There are many ways in which the right-holders6
under PDS and ICDS are officially excluded. The
most obvious amongst them is through not
committing adequate resources. Despite high
levels of child undernourishment in India and
mixed results in addressing the problem (Shiva
Kumar 2007), the attempted coverage of ICDS in
India still doesn’t match the levels recommended
by experts.7 Similarly, despite studies and reports
showing a much larger share of the population
facing poverty and food insecurity (Patnaik 2004,
2007), the resource commitment under PDS is
limited to a meagre 36 per cent of the Indian
population. Another way of officially excluding
right-holders involves failing to meet the
allocation commitments. Despite being in the
final year of the 11th Five Year Plan period we
are still 1.5 lakh short of the targeted number of
AWCs8 meant to cover at least 1.17 crore
potential beneficiaries.9
Such massive official exclusion, largely due to
low resource commitment, marginalises the
majority of India’s population who are in distress
(Vepa 2010; Walker 2008; Vakulabharanam
2005), especially among the agrarian and rural
population. It also disproportionately excludes
people from powerless and vulnerable social
groups (Social Equity Watch 2010; Mander 2008;
Mander and Kumaran 2006; Sinha 2005; Thorat
and Lee 2005). The majority of those officially
excluded are small farmers (Infochange 2007).
In the case of the ICDS programme, those most
affected by its limited coverage would be the
residents in Dalit, tribal and minority hamlets,
usually located on the fringes of the main village.
2.2 Groups excluded due to implementation flaws
Apart from overtly subverting funding
commitments, another way to exclude right-
holders is by not providing an operational
structure to deliver the programme and absorb
the core resources. Despite planning universal
access under ICDS, only 8.37 crore children were
officially covered against the target of 15.88
crore children aged 0–6. Similarly, in the case of
the PDS, according to official accounts,
foodgrains for 25 lakh BPL (below the poverty
line) households10 were not lifted from the
godowns.11, 12 More worryingly, not all the services
that are officially reported as being delivered
reach the relevant people. The large-scale survey
results from the third National Family Health
Survey (NFHS-3) (2005–06) show that on
average ‘only 32.9 per cent of children (living in
an area covered by an AWC) used any AWC
services’ (Saxena and Srivastava 2009). There
are other studies that confirm the low coverage
and give much lower access figures (Viswanathan
2006). Similarly, in the case of PDS, the
percentage of grain not reaching consumers
ranges from 24 to 54 per cent (Khera 2011;
Planning Commission 2005). A list of
implementation flaws that exclude right-holders
as reported in the literature and evaluation
studies (Wadwa Committee 2009; Supreme
Court Commissioner 2004, 2005, 2007; Planning
Commission 2005) is provided below.
1 A poor monitoring system resulting in
diversion/leakages that prevent resources
from reaching the service delivery points.
2 Local elite control over service delivery which
leads to overt corruption by service providers.
This happens through employing gatekeepers
as service providers or locating resources in the
habitation belonging to the powerful local elite.
3 Unaccountable service providers who do not
regularly open the service points, or open
them at inconvenient times; distribute less
than stipulated entitlements in terms of
quantity and quality; charge unwarranted
prices/or higher than stipulated prices to the
beneficiaries; and mislead the beneficiaries
with false information.
4 Direct discrimination based on caste, gender
and religion. 
5 Non-transparency on the part of service
providers and monitoring bodies.
6 A minimalist and diluted accountability
mechanism further entrenches exclusion and
discrimination. 
The implementation flaws mentioned above
occur in a power structure, where someone
benefits by excluding others. The benefits range
from shirking work responsibilities to cornering
resources meant for the beneficiaries. While the
exclusion mechanism at work generally affects
the poor and less aware masses, it is especially
harsh on landless workers, Dalits, tribals, female
children, single women households, religious
minorities, disabled and old and destitute people. 
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2.3 Groups excluded due to discriminatory and flawed
policy
A flawed policy is another major source of
exclusion under these two schemes. Some State
Governments have recognised these policy flaws
and have addressed them to make the schemes
more inclusive. However, despite the good
example set by these states, the Central
Government continues to ignore the lessons and
continues to follow flawed exclusionary policies. 
2.4 Targeting to exclude the poor
The major policy flaw that is widely debated and
contested by civil society is the attempt to target
and identify poor households under PDS. The
imposition of artificially low poverty figures by the
Central Government on states and the attempt to
‘objectively’ identify the poor has in fact resulted
in mass exclusion of the poor, as documented by
numerous studies and the government’s own
reports (Mane 2006; GoI 2002; Planning
Commission 2005, 2007). There are many states
which have shown that universal PDS is a much
better way of reaching the poor and addressing the
food security concerns of the masses (Khera 2011).
2.5 Policing the poor 
While the government is complicit with power
groups who manage to subvert the schemes at
macro and micro levels, it focuses its attention
on policing and preventing frauds and misuse of
ration cards by poor households. This focus has
in turn delayed the formulation of policies that
ensure inclusion of most vulnerable groups such
as migrant labourers, homeless people, urban
poor in unrecognised urban slums, communities
residing in forest villages and displaced
communities (Supreme Court Commissioners
2005, 2007 and 2008). 
2.6 Perpetuating social discrimination
Numerous reports show that the socioeconomic
status of Dalit/tribal people and minorities is
worse than that of dominant caste groups (Sachar
Committee 2006; Gragnolati et al. 2005; Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare 2002). In addition,
studies also show that access to services for these
social groups is much worse than for other social
groups (Acharya 2010; Mander and Kumaran
2006; Sinha 2005; Thorat and Lee 2005). A major
policy flaw in these two schemes is that instead of
addressing social discrimination associated with
gender, caste and disability, they perpetuate these.
On the pretext of efficiently locating these service
infrastructures in a central location, the entire
scheme is placed in ‘upper’ caste habitations
(Social Equity Watch 2010), legitimising the
core–periphery relation between the dominant
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Box 1 Example of three real-life cases of poor (very poor) families who would be left out of
the BPL list even if the SECC (Socio Economic Caste Census) is the criterion
1 Jagdish Gujjar (Other Backward Class, OBC) lives with his wife Kamla and his 17-year-
old unmarried son who is studying in class 11. He has two mud huts, and 2.5 bighas13 of
unirrigated land which is still in his father’s name. He is unsure of his age, but guesses
it’s around 60 years. He is too old to undertake manual labour, though they do allow him
to work on NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) worksites. Last year
he got 21 days of work, for which he was paid Rs 700, or about Rs 35/day. 
2 Uddi Gujjar is a widow who has two sons – Hanuman (16–17 years old) who studied till
class 6, and Prithviraj (15 years old) currently in class 11. She has one bigha of
unirrigated land in her name and one bigha is in the names of her two sons. Her
husband died of TB ten years ago, when her sons were still very young. She continues to
live in his village but not with his family. Whether her house will be categorised as
kachha14 or pukka15 depends on the discretion of the investigator. According to her, it is
kachha but because the roof is made of chaadar16 and cement it may be considered pukka.
3 Om Prakash Berwa (SC) lives with his wife Jena Devi and younger son Soji, aged 18
years, who is studying. He owns three bighas of unirrigated land. The family survives
mainly on casual labour, such as construction labour and NREGA work. They live in a
small brick house with a single room.
Source Drèze (2011). 
‘upper’ caste habitations and the marginalised
habitations of Dalit, tribal and religious minorities.
This, along with the appointment of ‘gatekeepers’
from the dominant caste groups as service
providers makes it very difficult for the people
from marginalised communities to demand
accountability (Social Equity Watch 2010).
Similarly, the ownership of household ration cards
rests with men and increases women’s dependence
on men within the household. The fair price shop
dealerships rest entirely with men, increasing
women’s dependence on men beyond the
household. Similarly, under the ICDS, take-home
rations are provided and it is assumed that the
goal of supplementary nutrition for women is
achieved. In case of transgender persons, the non-
issuance of ration cards further legitimises their
invisibilisation. 
2.7 Minimalistic costing
The utilitarian economic ideology which prescribes
‘user charges’ for minimalising economic costs, is
applied differently to these two schemes. The
schemes are strategically underfunded in a way
that at each level attempts are made to pass the
cost on to the ‘real’ users. Therefore the burden of
implementation is passed by Central Government
to the State Governments, which then attempt to
pass this on to the panchayats and service providers.
Hence the underpaid and overburdened AWWs
and the fair price shop dealers who are expected to
run unviable shops, gain moral legitimacy to
charge the beneficiaries illegally, either through
overcharging them or under-serving them. While
the users are not officially expected to pay for the
services, they end up paying for them in the form
of forgone services due to corrupt practices.
For example, unwarranted cost rationalisation
results in: overburdened AWWs who are unable
to perform essential ICDS functions (Saxena and
Srivastava 2009; CIRCUS 2006); unviable fair
price shops which cannot survive without
corruption (Standing Committee on Food,
Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution 2005);
AWWs serving low-quality food which is neither
nutritious nor palatable to children (CIRCUS
2006); beneficiaries unable to purchase rations
due to high prices at fair price shops (Supreme
Court Commissioners 2005); and private
partners severely lowering the quality of services
(Diwakar 2010). Poor people with low purchasing
power are invariably the most affected group due
to such underfunding of services. Further, the
poor living in resource-poor districts and states
are the worst affected (Supreme Court
Commissioners 2005). 
In some places, the local authorities even started
charging the users officially with a stated objective
of filling up the crucial funding gap (Supreme
Court Commissioners 2004, 2005). However, the
Supreme Court had banned overcharging or
reducing entitlements under these two schemes. 
2.8 Missing elements in the nutrition and health
agenda
Flawed policies lead directly to the exclusion of
some groups or areas. In the ICDS, the lack of
emphasis on health and nutritional services for
children aged 0–3 and their mothers, is a major
drawback which excludes a highly vulnerable
group. Similarly, the potential to diversify PDS
beyond rice and wheat is completely unexplored. 
2.9 Favouring large players and corporate interest
While setting up massive schemes such as the
PDS and ICDS it is important to ensure that the
resources invested are channelled towards
ensuring the welfare of the intended beneficiaries
rather than serving the vested interests of a few
or benefiting big players. In the case of ICDS,
despite the huge opportunity to procure and
process food in locally beneficial ways through
women’s groups and from small farmers, there is
an unjustified tendency to open up this avenue to
private companies selling ready-made processed
food (Baru et al. 2008). Similarly, the PDS
provides a big opportunity to procure from small
and marginal farmers, rather than procuring
from large farmers in a few states (GoI 2002).
The tendency to exclude the small and marginal
farmers and women’s groups is a result of policy
shortsightedness, which refuses to see the poor
as producers who could be food-secure in a
different way.
3 What can be done to change this?
Suggesting an agenda for change is a more
difficult task than diagnosing forms of exclusion
as it involves strategising in the context of the
prevailing political economy. Therefore no quick-
fix take-aways are attempted here. Rather, after
a brief analysis of the current policy climate, a
broader agenda for change is suggested.
The current policy climate assessed in the light
of the proposed National Food Security Bill,
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presents quite bleak prospects for addressing
exclusion in the PDS and ICDS.
1 Firstly, the proposed Bill continues with the
philosophy of targeting by identifying the poor
when implementing the PDS, and is therefore
likely to perpetuate the official exclusion
described earlier. However, the proposed
upward changes in targeting caps and
reiteration of the aim to cover every child with
the supplementary nutrition programme
(SNP) under ICDS, are positive signs and
point to possibilities for further changes in the
government’s rigid stance. 
2 Secondly, with regard to exclusion due to
implementation flaws, the scope for
justiciability, as proposed in the Bill is a
welcome step towards fixing accountability for
implementation flaws. However, the current
grievance redress mechanism proposed under
the law is vaguely defined and can be
subverted.
3 Thirdly, in the context of exclusion due to
faulty policies, there is a major
disappointment. The proposed Bill still
exhibits faith in arriving at a mechanism to
identify the poor. Similarly, it proposes to take
forward the legacy of discriminatory policies
and cost ‘rationalisation’, by not suggesting
any fundamental shifts. The worst part of the
Bill is that it completely neglects the nutrition
agenda by ignoring non-SNP services under
ICDS and opens up the scope for a corporate
takeover through introducing ready-to-use
food. Despite these limitations, some of the
proposed shifts are welcome. These include
the promise of providing ration cards in the
woman’s name and the proposal to cover
migrant labourers under the Act.
3.1 Agenda for action
The proposed Bill offers huge opportunities for
bringing about a fundamental shift in the way
PDS and ICDS work. That shift is more likely if
the government recognises that community
ownership and demand hold the key to success in
addressing exclusion in such massive schemes.
Such community ownership would be achieved
only when rights conferred through the Bill,
including grievance-redressal, are exercised by
the people. However, mere creation of rights
does not mean they would automatically get
exercised. Prolonged efforts and struggle are
needed to achieve the required transition. 
This requires a fundamental shift in the policy
assumptions of the government. The government
has to recognise that it is far easier for people to
exercise their rights when the bundles of rights
are more desirable. For instance, at places where
the PDS is well resourced, providing adequate,
affordable, good-quality and diversified
commodities, communities are more vocal when
their rights get violated. Such an understanding
would counter and replace the current official
diagnosis which laments lack of awareness and
interest on the part of communities and cites
that as the reason for dysfunctional and defunct
community-level monitoring groups. 
Similarly, it is important to have rights which
unify the masses with common interests and
provide stronger solidarity options rather than
dividing them on the basis of false BPL lines. It is
also argued in many studies that when the
service delivery points also cater to the relatively
better-off sections of society, the involvement of
socially and politically better-placed sections
makes the service providers more accountable
and improves the quality of services. The
experiences in Kerala and Tamil Nadu are good
examples to support this. Also, widening the
constituency of right-holders through
procurement from small and marginal farmers
and women’s groups would be an important step
towards encouraging democratic processes.
Therefore, creating a good-quality universal PDS
and ICDS would be an essential step in
translating these services into rights, which
people would aspire to rally around. Once
community groups start exercising their rights,
most of the problems plaguing the current PDS
and ICDS could be effectively solved. 
Secondly, it is important to recognise that if
instead of investing in building a better PDS and
ICDS, the resources are diverted towards quick
fixes, such as IT solutions, food coupons and cash
transfers, then the task at hand would become
more difficult. The current plans to use IT
solutions such as a UID (Unique Identification
Number) and biometric identification, are more
likely to confer power on administrators and
groups who would supposedly police and monitor
the poor. If these quick fixes have to be used at
all, then they should be directed towards
empowering the people. It is the service
providers and government officials – the key
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sources of massive leakages – who need to be
monitored by people through UIDs and
smartcards. 
Thirdly, in the new universal systems, one has to
discard the misplaced policy assumption that
attempts to address discrimination would put at
risk the larger goal of achieving food security.17 It
is important to recognise that when social
discrimination is a major reason for food
insecurity it would be impossible to address it
without challenging discrimination. Therefore
mechanisms to mobilise, organise and empower
the social groups facing discrimination are an
important parallel step that needs to be taken to
achieve inclusiveness in the scheme. 
Finally, it is true that putting in place good-
quality, universal and inclusive services under
ICDS and PDS is only a small step towards
achieving food and nutritional security for
excluded groups. However, in the light of fierce
opposition from policymakers and a few experts,
this small step assumes much greater
significance. It is important to remember that
only after the 1990s, in the context of dogmatic
pursuit of free-market policies, were these two
schemes seriously considered as a means to
protect food entitlements of the poor and
vulnerable.18 Now it is important to also consider
these schemes as a means of mobilising the
community towards fixing the broken food
system in India.
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Notes
1 For example, pulses and kerosene.  
2 Estimate based on the provisional population
total of Census 2011.
3 Estimate based on 2010/11 foodgrain offtake
figures as given by the Department of Food
and Public Distribution (2011).
4 A 300–800 population norm is used in tribal/
riverine/desert/hilly and other difficult areas
and a 150–400 population norm for Mini ICDS
centres.
5 Apart from supplementary feeding, ICDS
includes a package of five essential services:
(1) non-formal preschool education;
(2) nutrition and health education;
(3) immunisation; (4) health check-ups; and
(5) referral services (in conjunction with
village-level health workers).
6 As defined by the Supreme Court of India in
the right to food case – Civil Writ (196 of 2001)
PUCL vs UoI and others. 
7 In 2006 the Supreme Court (Civil Writ 196 of
2001 PUCL vs UoI and others) looking at the
gravity of child malnutrition in India has
decreed that ICDS must be universal. The
XI Plan in turn budgeted for 14 lakh AWCs,
far fewer than the requirement for 17 lakh
AWCs estimated by Drèze and Shonali Sen
(2004) for the National Advisory Committee. 
8 Calculation based on Number of Operational
AWCs reported by the Ministry of Women and
Child Development (2011).
9 Calculation based on average beneficiary per
AWC (Ministry of Women and Child
Development 2011).
10 Based on BPL offtake figures reported for
2009/10 (Department of Food and Public
Distribution 2011).
11 Godowns are storehouses where PDS foodgrain
is stored.
12 However, it must be noted, in this regard, that
the situation has improved over the last
decade. Earlier in 2001, in the case of PDS,
around 4.2 crore BPL households did not
claim the allocated foodgrains. Similarly in
ICDS, during 2003–04, there were only
3.42 crore children aged 0–6 officially covered.
13 Bigha – a traditional unit of land area in South
Asia. It varies in size from region to region but
is generally less than one acre (0.4ha).
14 Kachha – a structure that is partly made of
mud, thatch or wood.
15 Pukka – a house that is built entirely of
concrete cement and has four walls and a roof.
16 Chaadar – asbestos sheets.
17 For example, on these grounds, officials do
not allow siting of the ICDS in Dalit hamlets.
Instead they place it in general caste hamlets,
where the Dalits find it difficult to access the
scheme.
18 See Sobhan (1990) and Srivastava (2006).
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